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Abstract. This paper analyses the European Emission Trading System
(ETS) from a network perspective. It is shown that the network exhibits
a strong core-periphery structure also reflected in the network formation
process. Due to a lack of centralized market places, operators of instal-
lations which fall under the EU ETS regulations have to resort to local
networks or financial intermediaries if they want to participate in the
market. This undermines the central idea of the ETS to exploit marginal
abatement costs.
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1 The European Emission Trading System
1.1 Background
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) [2] from 1998 extended the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFFCCC) [1] negotiated in 1992 during the
UN Conference on Environment and Development by defining targets for the re-
duction of green house gas (GHG) emissions into the atmosphere. These targets
follow the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” as outlined
in Article 3 of the KP [2]. Accommodating the responsibility of industrialized
countries for the contemporary levels of GHG emissions, these targets were de-
termined to be binding for the group of developed signatory states referred to
as the Annex 1 parties. The protocol was signed and ratified by 191 parties of
which one was the European Union4.5
The Annex 1 parties comprise 37 industrialized countries of which 28 are
now members of the European Union. The legally binding commitment of the
4 Council Decision of 15 December 1993 [3]
5 Noteworthy exceptions are the United States which signed but never ratified the KP
and finally withdrew in 2001 and Canada which quit the treaty in 2011.
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signatory countries concerns the most relevant greenhouse gases and gas groups.6
The targets themselves are however quantified in CO2 equivalents with regard
to global warming potential and as percentages of the emissions in a base year,
which, for the majority of the Annex 1 parties, is 1990. The European Union as
a whole committed itself to collectively reduce CO2 emissions by 8% until 2012
and 20% until 2020 with respect to base year emissions. Under the premise of
“common but shared responsibilities” member state specific reduction goals were
defined, which take into account the different levels of economic development
within the union, the respective structures of the national economies as well as
early measures to reduce GHG emissions.
To keep the costs of limiting CO2 emissions as small as possible for the signa-
tory countries the KP allows for so called “flexible mechanisms” which serve as
an alternative to traditional approaches like carbon taxes or compensating mea-
sures as reforestation (Art. 3.3) [2]. These mechanisms comprise International
Emission Trading (IET), Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) [2, Art. 12]
and Joint Implementation (JI) (Art. 6)[2].
Emission Trading The concept of IET plays the central role of flexible emission
reduction instruments. It exploits differing marginal abatement costs (MAC)7
between countries, firms, industries or even between different branches within
a company [7]. The system bases on a “cap-and-trade” principle in which per-
mitted emission units, so called allowance units 8, are allocated to emitters of
green house gases. These assigned allowance units (AAU) normally depend on
historical yearly green house gas emission data and are capped with regard to
committed emission reduction targets. Thereby allowance units become a scarce
good which participants can exchange in a market context. Periodically mar-
ket participants which are legally committed to reduce their emissions have to
surrender the amount of allowance units in their possession. These are subse-
quently compared with the realized emissions which are permanently recorded at
the respective installations to check if the emission reduction targets were met.
Installations can be factories, power plants or even aircrafts. If the available al-
lowance units fall short of the realized emissions the obliged market participants
have to pay a fine proportional to the allowance units by which the emission
reduction obligations were missed.
Clean Development Mechanism & Joint Implementation The system of emis-
sion trading is complimented by the CDM and the JI mechanism. In contrast to
emission trading these mechanisms are project based. Predicated on the assump-
tion that actions which lead to the reduction of GHG eventually have positive
effects in slowing down global warming no matter where on the planet they are
conducted, Annex 1 countries can engage in GHG emission reducing projects
6 Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons
and perfluorocarbons
7 This is the marginal cost of reducing green house gas emissions by one unit.
8 One emission allowance unit typically corresponds to one metric ton of CO2-
equivalent.
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abroad in order to earn emission reduction units (ERU) which in turn can be
traded on the emission market or used when surrendering one’s allowances at the
end of a compliance period. While the JI mechanism is supposed to foster coop-
eration between Annex 1 countries9 to meet their GHG reduction targets, the
CDM aims to stimulate GHG reducing investments and projects in non-Annex
1 countries (mainly developing countries) to promote sustainable development
(Art. 12) [2] and to help Annex 1 countries to meet their emission reduction
commitments with the lowest possible costs.
1.2 The adoption of European Emission Trading System and its
Functioning
Since Japan rejected all attempts to give the UN the legal instruments to enforce
the emission reduction commitments in the KP and the United States withdrew
from the protocol in 2001 it became soon clear that the EU had to find an
internal solution if it wanted to stick to the GHG reduction targets to which
it committed itself in the KP [8]. After an understanding was found between
member states to differentiate the GHG reduction targets with regard to the level
of economic development in the form of the “burden sharing agreement” (BSA)
[10], the initial resistance with regard to the implementation of a European
emission trading scheme (ETS) began to crumble. The European Union emission
trading scheme was finally legally implemented by directive 2003/87/EC [9]10
and subsequently adopted into national laws.
The ETS covers factories, power stations, and other installations with a net
heat excess of 20 MW in emission intensive industries responsible for roughly
50% of the GHG emissions in the concerned 31 countries (EU plus Switzerland,
Norway and Liechtenstein). With directive 2008/101/EC the aviation industry
was also included into the ETS. The emission allowance units (EUA) are allo-
cated to each of the approximately 11,000 installations in February each year on
a national level in line with the respective BSA and KP reduction targets and
have to be surrendered by the operator holding accounts (OPA) at latest end of
April in the subsequent year. The fine for each EUA after surrendering that falls
short of the verified emissions amounts to EUR 100. Operators are allowed to
bank and respectively borrow allowances within a trading period. It was however
not permitted to carry allowances from Pilot Phase I (2005 - 2007) to Phase II
(2008-20012), and from there to Phase III (2013 - 2020) [11].
The ETS is not only open to OHAs, but also private entities which don’t
fall under the ETS regulation are allowed against a fee to trade on the emission
market. These entities are referred to as private holding accounts (PHA). EUAs
can be traded bilaterally, over the counter (OTC) via a broker or on one of
9 The majority of currently ongoing Joint Implementation projects are situated in
transition economies with Annex 1 obligations like the Russian Federation and
Ukraine [6]
10 The directive was later amended by Directive 2004/101/EC, Directive 2008/101/EC,
Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 and Directive 2009/29/EC
3
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Europe’s climate exchange markets like the European Climate Exchange (ECX),
the European Energy Exchange AG (EEX) etc. For the time for which the
transaction data set is available the most common form of transactions was
OTC.
As prescribed by 2003/87/EC and 2009/29/EC every transaction in the ETS
has to be recorded in some sort of accounting system (registries) and is accessible
to the public with an embargo of three years. At the beginning these registries
were organized on a national level. Since 2008 this function is resumed by a
central Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) accessible online un-
der http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/. The transaction data from the
CITL form the base of our network-based analysis of the EU ETS.
2 The data set
The transaction data set containing the exact time stamp of the transaction
and its volume as well as information about the accounts active in the ETS and
data with regard to the allowance allocation, the surrendering of the allowances
as well as the verified emissions were scraped from the CITL. The raw data
set contains approximately 520,000 transactions to which we added spot price
information downloaded from Bloomberg as well as data about the ownership
structure and the type of companies in the ETS from the “Ownership Links
and Enhanced EUTL Dataset” [12]. In our analysis we concentrate only on the
market movements which are relevant for the price formation of the EUA cer-
tificates (transaction types 3-0, 3-21 and 10-0). Transactions connected to the
administration of the ETS as for the allowance issuance, retirement, cancella-
tion, surrender, allocation, and correction were discarded. The remaining 364,810
transactions are analyzed in what follows.
3 Methodology and research questions
A network based analysis of the European Emission market is performed. A
network based on the transaction data set is therefore constructed. Thereby
agents active in the emission market are regarded as vertices. These vertices
are connected by directed edges in the form of transactions from the seller (the
source vertex) to the buyer (the target vertex). The edges are weighted by the
volume of EUAs transferred in the respective transaction. Figure 1 shows a plot
of the resulting network graph.
The aim is to investigate the connection between the network structure and
the functioning of the market. In this context the following research questions are
to be addressed: 1) Is the organization of the market reflected in the structure
of the network? 2) Which factors are relevant for the matching process on the
EU ETS? 3) Is the network structure supporting the idea of emission markets
to exploit differences in marginal abatement costs? 4) Does the position of an
agent within the network have an implication for its ability to create revenues
out of a trade?
4
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Fig. 1. The CO2 trading network [CDM (green), finance (red), foundation (yellow),
government (orange), industry (blue)]
4 The Network structure of the European Emission
markets
Following Li et al. [13] some tests with regard to the market structure were
conducted. Figure 2 plots the in- and out-degrees11 vs. the cliquishness12 of
agents. The downward sloping cloud implies a hierarchy in the market with a
strong core of highly connected nodes and clusters of nodes on the periphery. This
phenomenon can also be observed in the plot of the emission market network in
Figure 1.
The core periphery structure of the trading network is also observable when
looking at the degree distribution directly (see Figure 3): The distributions of
the in-, out- and total-degrees follow a power law i.e. there are agents whose in-,
out- or total degrees strongly exceed the average. The exponents of the power-
law distributions fitted to the in-, out- and total-degree-distribution are 2.25,
11 The in- and out-degrees of each agent: this means the active and passive connected-
ness of agents.
12 Be the k-core of graph a maximal subgraph in which each vertex has at least degree
k. The cliquishness or coreness of a vertex is then k if it belongs to the k-core but
not to the (k+1)-core.[15]
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Fig. 2. In-/Out-Degree vs. Cliquishness (in-degree: blue; out-degree: red)
2.29 and 2.21 respectively. A conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the degree
distributions resulted in p-values of 0.76, 0.97 and 0.96 respectively, indicating
that the hypothesis that the original data could have been drawn from the
fitted power-law distributions cannot be rejected in several cases. The observed
network thus falls into the category of scale free networks.
We further computed the density distribution of multiple network statistics
(in-, out- degree as well as eigenvector centrality 13) as well as for profits of
companies in the European emission market combined with informations about
their type.
In this case the core-periphery structure is observable in the wave-like forms
of the density plots displayed in Figure 4. This structure is also reflected in the
network plot in Figure 1 which has a highly connected center which is dominated
by nodes from the finance sector (red) surrounded by concentric circles of nodes
from the industries (OHA). Going from the inside to the outside the nodes are
lesser connected and thus exhibit a lower degree of centrality. Looking at the
plot in the lower right of Figure 4 this, at least for the group of agents which
13 Eigenvector centrality: the first eigenvector of the adjacency matrix giving the cen-
tralities for each vertex. It can be understood as a reciprocal process in which the
centrality of a vertex depends proportionally on the centralities of other vertices to
which it is connected.
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Fig. 3. In-/Out-/Total-Degree distribution with fitted power law
can be attributed to the sector government, seems to have an influence on the
profits these respective agents are able to derive from trading on the emission
market.
5 Network position, trading volume and profits
To further investigate the connection between the position of an individual com-
pany within the network and its market participation (trade volume) on the one
hand and its ability to derive profits from the market on the other hand we fol-
low Boyd et al. [16] in computing more sophisticated individual coreness values
than the k-core (cliquishness) measure which was used above. Boyd et al. [16]
show that a singular value decomposition (SVD) of the adjacency matrix com-
bined with a prior imputation of missing values on the diagonal represents a fast
and reliable method to compute the out- (u) and in-coreness (v) of individual
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Fig. 4. Densities plots for various trade network statistics and company types in the
ETS
agents within a large graph. The coreness of an agent is high, if an agent is well
connected with other well connected agents. The SVD is methodologically and
in terms of interpretation similar to the eigenvector centrality discussed above.
The so computed coreness values as well as information about agents profits and
volumes traded in the market were then used in combination with interpola-
tion by means of local polynomial regression fitting to create the elevation plots
displayed in Figure 5.
Looking at the plot on the left-hand side in Figure 5 it appears as the ability
to generate profits on the ETS positively depends on the out-coreness of an
individual. The market participation on the other hand depends positively on
both the in- and out-coreness of an agent. As far as the in-coreness is concerned
this effect seems to be slightly weaker.
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Fig. 5. Elevation plots of out- (u) and in- (v) coreness values with respect to the gener-
ated profits (left) and market participation (total volume traded) (right) of individual
agents
6 Network formation
The results from the last two sections can be interpreted as some kind of infor-
mational asymmetry in the market. OHAs which are legally forced to participate
in the emission market and are seeking to buy and sell emission certificates re-
sort to local networks (firms from the same parent company, country, industry
etc.) or to huge financial players which form the center of the trading network.
This undermines the central idea of the emission market to take advantage of
differentials in abatement costs. This interpretation is further supported when
we take a closer look at the network formation process.
A basic method within this class of approaches to investigate the formation
process of a network is the Maslov-Sneppen [17] algorithm: comparing the em-
pirical network with a quantity of random networks with the identical degree
sequence and distribution allows us to generate degree-degree correlation pro-
files which permit to identify connectivity patterns between nodes of different
degrees. The so called null-model is generated by systematically rewiring the
original network. Two pairs of connected nodes A− > B and C− > D are
randomly selected from a network and rewired in the fashion A− > D and
C− > B. If the thereby generated new connections already exist the proce-
dure is aborted and two new pairs of connected nodes are selected and the
rewiring attempt is repeated. Doing this sufficiently often, a rule of thumb
suggests a number as high as ten times the number of edges, one obtains a
random model with the same degree sequence and distribution as the origi-
nal graph. This procedure is repeated multiple times. Then the generated null-
models are compared with the original network. More precisely, we compare
the number of edges between two nodes with degrees K1 and K2 in the em-
9
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pirical network N(K1,K2) and the mean in the generated random networks
N¯r(K1,K2):R(K1,K2) = N(K1,K2)/N¯r(K1,K2). Whether the deviance of the
empirical network from the null-model is significant can be assessed by comput-
ing the Z-scores: Z(K1,K2) = (N(K1,K2)−N¯r(K1,K2))/sigma(K1,K2), where
sigma(K1,K2) is the standard deviation of N¯r(K1,K2). This method works for
directed and undirected networks. The results of the Maslov-Sneppen approach
for the emission trading network are presented in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. Degree-degree correlation profiles generated by the Maslov-Sneppen algorithm
The interpretation of the degree-degree correlation profiles is twofold: 1)
When interpreting the emission trading network as an undirected graph one
recognizes a compared to the null model significantly increased connectedness
between highly connected nodes (the red area in the upper right corner of the
LHS plot). 2) In both the undirected and the directed case (RHS) we note a sig-
nificantly increased degree of asymmetric connectedness, i.e. between low- and
high degree nodes (the orange to red area along the axes). This is in line with
the results of a strong core-periphery structure presented earlier in the paper.
A bit more involved but based on a similar idea is the class of Exponential
Random Graph models (ERGM). A random graph Y is made up by a set of n
nodes and e edges {Yij : i = 1, . . . , n; j = 1, . . . , n} where, similar to a binary
choice model, Yij = 1 if the nodes (i, j) are connected and Yij = 0 if this is not
10
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the case. One can thus model the given network by
P (Y = y|θ) = exp(θ
T g(y))
c(θ)
where θ and g(y) are vectors of parameters and network statistics respectively
and c(θ) =
∑
exp{θtg(y)} is a normalizing constant corresponding to all possi-
ble networks. Evaluating above expression (as the number of possible outcomes
vastly exceeds the number of constraining parameters this is usually done by
Gibbs sampling) allows us to make assertions whether and how certain nodal
attributes influence the network formation process. These nodal attributes can
be endogenous to the network (like the in- and out-degrees of a node) or exoge-
nous as in the context of the trading network for example the country in which
a specific company is registered.[18]
Dependent variable:
carbon network
edges −4.785∗∗∗
(0.172)
triangle 0.321∗∗∗
(0.026)
asymmetric −3.711∗∗∗
(0.166)
nodematch.type −0.099∗∗∗
(0.019)
nodematch.country 0.392∗∗∗
(0.031)
nodematch.guo 0.757∗∗∗
(0.285)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 527,052.300
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 527,150.300
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 1. A simple ERGM model applied to the ETS network
We ran a basic ERGM model over the emission trading network. The re-
sults are presented in Table 1. The most important features of the results are
as follows: We observe positive log-odds for the closing of triangles (clusters),
homophily for country and general ultimate owner (GUO)respectively. We how-
ever remark negative log-odds for the formation of ties between agents of the
same type (i.e. OHA vs PHA). We thus see what we already observed graphi-
cally earlier in the paper: OHAs who seek to sell or buy EUAs have to address
themselves to local networks (homophily as far as origin [country] and owner-
ship [GUO] is concerned) or to financial institutions or brokers (heterophily with
regard to type).
11
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7 Conclusion
The EU ETS network is characterized by a significant core-periphery structure
which is also reflected in an asymmetry within the degree-degree correlation
profiles computed by the Maslov-Sneppen algorithm. This has effects on the
profits agents are able to derive from the market and their market participation
in general. An ERGM analysis shows that OHAs have to resort to local networks
or financial intermediaries when they want to participate in the market. This
might be due to the fact that the EU ETS is not organized in a central market
place but based to a large extent (for the time the data was available) on OTC
transactions. This in our opinion violates the central idea of exploiting differences
in marginal abatement costs, imposes unnecessary additional costs on the OHAs
who often don’t possess the resources to collect informations about the market
and thus undermines the goal of the EU ETS.
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